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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

SD-19962-1

**TOP SECRET CONTROL**  
**INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, GSUSA**

CSGID-IWW 319.26

20 JAN 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

023508

SUBJECT: Proposed Watch Committee

1. The probability that the National Security Council will approve the proposed amendment to NSCID No. 1, with respect to crisis estimates, raises the question of adequate machinery to insure that the IAC will have continually available to it the necessary inter-departmental intelligence for the production of crisis estimates. Unless such machinery exists, the IAC will be seriously handicapped in discharging its responsibilities for crisis estimates.
2. The only existing machinery appears to be the so-called Check List Group which the DCI described at the IAC meeting of 19 August 1949 when the Department of State's proposed establishment of a Watch Committee was under discussion. Your Memorandum of 7 December 1949 (CIA # 34092) further discusses the Check List Group.
3. Careful study of this 7 December Memorandum, supplemented by an investigation of the Check List's operation, has led to the conclusion that the Check List Group as now established provides insufficient intelligence support for the IAC's responsibilities under the proposed amendment to NSCID No. 1. It is believed that the Department of State's proposal for the establishment of a Watch Committee should be reconsidered with a view to its authorization by a DCI directive, in accordance with provisions to be agreed upon by the IAC. - 23472
4. Inclosed herewith as Tab A is a more detailed discussion of the results of the Intelligence Division's study of the 7 December Memorandum. Also inclosed as Tab B is a proposed IAC agreement for a Watch Committee.
5. It is recommended that early consideration be given to this matter.
6. Copies of this Memorandum have been informally furnished to the other IAC members for their information.

2 Incls

1. Tab A - Comments by DI on operation of "Check List"
2. Tab B - Proposed IAC Agreement

*[Signature]*  
A. R. KOLLING  
General, GSC

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Army review(s) completed. Director of Intelligence

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
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

## REGISTRY

LOGGED BY: ns

FORM NO. 38-13 PREVIOUS EDITIONS NOT TO BE USED  
APR 1948

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TAB "A"

COMMENTS BY DI/GSUSA ON CURRENT OPERATION OF THE "CHECK LIST"

1. Close observation of the "Check List," since it was described to the IAC by the DCI at the meeting of 19 August 1949, has led the DI/GSUSA to the firm conclusion that the current Check List operation inadequately satisfies the urgent need of a continuing joint analysis of intelligence indications of probable future Soviet courses of action.

2. Aside from the fact that since the IAC meeting of 19 August 1949 the Check List officers met together only once between that date and 17 January 1950, the present informal operation of the Check List has the following major defects, so far as the Army is concerned:

*Never intended to*  
*State?*  
a. It does not provide the Army with the continuous, thorough, and competent analysis of Soviet political, economic, sociological, naval and air developments which is necessary for the production of rounded intelligence estimates of the present Soviet position and future courses of action. Without such coordinated analysis of Soviet capabilities and intentions by the intelligence experts in the Departments of State, Navy, and Air, the Intelligence Division of the Army is severely handicapped in discharging its responsibility for keeping the planning and policy-making elements of the Army continually informed on significant Soviet developments. The same difficulty, of course, is applicable to the responsibility which the Army shares with the Navy and the Air Force for keeping the JCS and joint field commands similarly informed.

b. It does not lead to periodic estimates of the current Soviet position, prepared jointly by the most capable analysts of CIA and State, Army, Navy, and Air Intelligence, for the benefit of all agencies responsible for national defense. In the subject under discussion and kindred matters, it appears that CIA has taken the position that coordinated, comprehensive intelligence is exclusively the competence of CIA because it has responsibility for the production of national intelligence for the President, the Secretary of Defense, the NSC, etc. This attitude has had an unfortunate tendency to impede the production of such coordinated, comprehensive intelligence for the benefit of levels lower than those just mentioned. Furthermore, it would seem that the CIA, in the production of its own national intelligence estimates, would substantially benefit from the collaboration of the most capable analysts of State, Army, Navy and Air Intelligence.

3. The deficiencies of the current Check List operation are largely traceable to the fact that since the working group has not been formally authorized, its objectives and procedures have never been submitted to the participating agencies for their concurrence. The Memorandum of the DCI, referred to in paragraph 1 above, states the "responsibilities . . . are clearly defined and procedures for emergency action will be direct and positive." It is not clear as to what authority is the basis for

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
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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr Childs.

FROM :



SUBJECT:


Memo re Water Gate.

DATE: 10/Feb

11:30 -

STAT

STAT



called to say he desired to offer some comments on the draft we produced yesterday afternoon. He will be unable to produce the comments until Monday. Would you therefore hold up dispatch of the memo until you get his comments?

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having established these responsibilities or what concurrences have been obtained from the participating agencies.

4. The crystallizing provisions for the production of National Crisis Estimates and the JCS program, which is currently in the formative stages, for the production of a joint estimate for dispatch to commanders upon the imminency or outbreak of war furnish additional convincing reasons for the early establishment of the Check List operation on a firmer foundation. A continuing interdepartmental analysis of significant indications, accompanied by periodic reports and estimates, would insure the production of the foregoing estimates with a minimum of delay and an avoidance of unnecessary confusion upon the arrival of a crisis.

5. In order that the Check List operation be established on a basis which will facilitate the accomplishment of its vitally important mission, it is recommended that the attached proposal for the establishment of a permanent interdepartmental Watch Committee on Soviet capabilities and probable courses of action be submitted to the IAC at an early date.

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TAB "B"

PROPOSED IAC AGREEMENT

SUBJECT: Permanent Watch Committee



*not Check List*

25X1

no.  
no.  
no.  
1. A permanent committee (hereinafter referred to as the Watch Committee) is hereby established to (a) analyze intelligence information relating to short and long range Soviet intentions to go to war, and (b) produce periodic intelligence estimates on this subject as it affects national security. The Watch Committee will work in accordance with the established NSCID and DCI directives.

2. The Watch Committee shall act under the chairmanship of CIA and shall comprise:

|             |   |           |
|-------------|---|-----------|
| Chairman    | - | CIA       |
| Member      | - | State     |
| Member      | - | Army      |
| Member      | - | Navy      |
| Member      | - | Air Force |
| Secretariat | - | CIA       |

Ad hoc members as needed may be determined by the regular members.

3. The Watch Committee will, in the first instance, establish methods of procedure.

4. The Committee will meet at regular intervals, adjusting the frequency of its meetings from time to time in relation to the need for maintenance and revision of its work.

5. The Committee will be responsible for:

a. On a long range basis

- (1) Bringing up to date in a comprehensive basic estimate the existing estimates and studies relating to USSR intentions for war.
- (2) Producing at appropriate intervals or upon request revisions of the comprehensive estimate.

b. On a short range basis

- (1) Arranging periodic exchange amongst its members of information relating to Soviet intentions to go to war.

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- (2) Producing from such exchange interim estimates which will indicate the bearing of available current information on the most recent basic comprehensive estimate.
- (3) Furnishing IAC with such crisis intelligence as required by IAC to discharge its responsibility, as set forth in paragraph 6, NSCID 1.

*not the Advisory Committee but the DCI  
who has the responsibility under the Law.*

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